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Abstract
This paper considers the relative efficiency of unit tax and ad valorem
tax in Cournot doupoly in the presence of licensing opportunities after the
announcement of the tax rates by the government. Anderson et al. (2001)
shows that in such a case ad valorem tax welfare dominates the unit tax.
However, it ignores the licensing possibilities. Interestingly, it is shown in
the present paper that in case of fixed-fee licensing unit tax sometimes dom-
inates ad valorem tax. However, unit tax and ad valorem tax are equally
efficient in case of royalty licensing.
Keywords: Unit tax, Ad valorem tax, Cournot Competition, Licensing
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1. Introduction
Taxes that are levied on the production or consumption of goods and
services or on imports and exports are generally known as indirect taxes.
Examples of indirect taxes are sales taxes, value-added taxes (VAT), taxes
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on any aspect of manufacturing or production, taxes on legal transactions,
and customs or import duties. Among these unit taxes are levied on per unit
of output produced or sold and ad valorem taxes are collected on the value
of the production or transaction. An extensive literature in economic theory,
is devoted to the study of welfare consequences of various taxations under
alternative market structures.4 In a perfectly competitive market structure
unit taxes and ad-valorem taxes are symmetrical in terms of welfare. Both
these types of taxes, generate an identical equilibrium with the same output,
when they are imposed to extract equal tax revenues5. This implies that if
government is willing to extract a certain amount of tax revenue, it can go
for either of the two taxation schemes as both of these schemes are equally
efficient. However in case of imperfectly competitive markets, the story gets
more nuanced. Suits and Musgrave (1953) proves the superiority of adval-
orem taxes over unit taxes in a general monopoly setting. Schroder (2004)
shows unit taxes are less efficient than ad valorem taxes in a market char-
acterized by monopolistic competition. This is because unit taxes distort
prices while ad valorem taxation, since it is levied on profits, only reduces
the number of firms operating in the market. Myles (1996) and Hamilton
(1999) argues that tax/subsidy policies can be used to improve welfare by
reducing the distortion due to product market imperfection. Though in a
homogeneous product oligopoly with a fixed number of firms, both specific
and ad valorem taxes reduce industry output and lead to efficiency loss (See
Seade, 1985 and Stern, 1987), one may be less distortionary than the other.
Delipalla and Keen (1992) and Anderson et al. (2001) show the superiority
of ad valorem tax in case homogeneous Cournot oligopoly if the firms have
symmetric costs. It has been argued that for any tax revenue, there always
exists an ad valorem tax which provides the same tax yields with higher so-
cial surplus as compared to unit taxes. Denicolo and Matteuzzi (2000) and
Anderson et al. (2001) also extends this result by considering asymmetric
firms.
A parallel literature in industrial organisation deals with the issue of
technology licensing among firms in a oligopolistic market structure. In the
present era of globalization and economic integration technology transfer
between firms has become more common than ever (See Vishwasrao, 2007
4There has been substantial reform in the tax policies in various countries in the last
century. Ahmed and Stern (1984) addresses these issues in the Indian context.
5Governments generally impose taxes to generate revenue.
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and Hu et al., 2005). The most common forms of licensing are by either
fixed-fee or royalty. Rostocker (1984) for example shows that royalty alone
is used for 39 percent of time, fixed-fee alone for 13 percent and both in-
struments together for 46 percent. Shapiro (1985) discusses the possibilities
of licensing in Cournot duopoly market where firms produce homogeneous
product via fixed-fee, royalty and two-part tariff. It points out that the
licensor cannot charge a per-unit royalty such that the effective unit cost of
the licensee is greater than in case of no-licensing, as this type of agreements
are abandoned by the anti-trust law.6 Marjit (1990) discuss the possibili-
ties of licensing by fixed-fee in a Cournot duopoly model and shows that
technology is licensed if the initial cost difference is low. Gallini and Winter
(1990) and Wang (1998) also considers licensing by royalty. Wang (1998)
and Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002) show that in case of royalty licensing
technology is always licensed. Sen and Tauman (2007) however provides a
general licensing schemes to explore the implications of licensing for both
the outside and the inside innovator. Sen (2014) studies the role of licensing
in affecting the innovation decisions of the firms. Mukherjee and Tsai (2013)
also examines the role of government policy in technology licensing decision.
The present paper, is the first attempt to incorporate the possibility of
technology licensing, while government imposes ad valorem and unit taxa-
tion. In a duopoly market firms, with asymmetric costs of production are
assumed to engage in Cournot (quantity) competition. After government
announces the possible tax scheme, firms may engage in technology licens-
ing.
It is shown that under unit taxation, if technology is licensed by fixed-fee,
tax revenue, consumer surplus and industry profit increases after transfer.
On the other hand if technology is licensed when an ad valorem tax has been
levied, the tax revenue reduces but consumer surplus and industry profit in-
creases. This implies that under ad valorem taxation, for higher tax revenue
the government may set the advalorem tax rate as high as possible such that
technology is not licensed 7. It is shown that in case of licensing by fixed-fee
if technology is licensed in both the tax schemes then ad valorem tax still
dominates the unit tax. However in contrast to Anderson et al. (2001) even
6In case of royalty licensing the present paper considers this type of restrictions in
framing the licensing contracts.
7That is when the government is interested in enhancing the revenue and not welfare.
3
in homogeneous Cournot model unit tax can dominate ad valorem tax. This
is because if the ad valorem tax rate is such that technology is not licensed,
then there exists a unit tax such that technology is licensed and social sur-
plus is more than in the case of ad valorem tax.
Technology licensing will always take place if the mode of licensing is
per unit royalty, independent of the mode of taxation. Tax revenue and the
consumer surplus remains unchanged after licensing, while only the indus-
try profit increases. Hence interestingly, under royalty licensing the two tax
schemes are equally efficient. Under royalty licensing, thus for any ad val-
orem tax rate there exists an unit tax rate which ensures equal equilibrium
output in the two tax schemes, which entails equal consumer surplus and
equal gross industry profit under the two tax schemes. This ensures same
social surplus under the two tax schemes. However, if the government choose
ad valorem tax in such a situation then after licensing the government tax
revenue will be more and the net industry profit will be less in ad valorem
tax than in case of unit tax.
The first section is the benchmark case where technology could not be
transferred in presence of any kind of indirect taxation. The next two sec-
tions discuss the effect of taxation in presence of fixed-fee and royalty licens-
ing respectively. Finally we conclude.
2. The Benchmark Case
This section is based on Anderson et al. (2001). They show that in a
Cournot duopoly market ad valorem taxation are more efficient than unit
taxes. However, the purpose of the present model is to understand how this
dominance goes through when inter firm technology licensing opportunities
are present. To facilitate comparison we discuss the model of Anderson et
al. (2001) briefly, assuming a linear market demand.
Consider a Cournot duopoly where each firm produces a homogeneous
product. The (inverse) market demand is given by P = a − q, where q =
q1 + q2, and q, q1 and q2 are the output produced by the industry, firm 1
and firm 2 respectively. Firm 1 and firm 2 respectively produce output, q1
and q2, at constant unit production cost c1 and c2 respectively (c1 > c2).
P is the market price; a > 0. Further assume that c1 < c¯1 =
a+c2
2 , as for
c1 ≥ c¯1, firm 2 is the monopolist in absence of any tax. In the equilibrium,
4
output and profit of firm i in absence of any tax are
q∗i =
(a− 2ci + cj)
3
and Π∗i =
(a− 2ci + cj)2
9
respectively, where i, j = (1, 2) and i 6= j.
Without any loss of generality assume c2 = 0 throughout. Under a
unit tax, t(> 0) per unit of output sold, the effective unit cost of the firms
increases by t. For firm 1 and firm 2 the effective unit cost under unit tax
are c1 + t and t respectively. In this context the profit function of firm i is
Πi = [P − (ci + t)]qi.
Therefore in the equilibrium outputs of firm 1 and firm 2 in presence of unit
tax of level t are
qu1 =
a− 2(c1 + t) + t
3
and qu2 =
a− 2t+ (c1 + t)
3
. (1)
Similarly, the profits of firm 1 and firm 2 are8
Πu1 =
[a− 2(c1 + t) + t]2
9
and Πu2 =
[a− 2t+ (c1 + t)]2
9
. (2)
Therefore the tax revenue collected under unit tax of level t is
Ru = t(q
u
1 + q
u
2 ) = t
[
2a− (c1 + t)− t
3
]
. (3)
However, under an ad valorem tax, the producer price is (1 − τ)P ,
where τ ∈ [0, 1] is the advalorem tax rate. Therefore the profit function of
firm i is
Πi = [(1− τ)P − ci]qi = (1− τ)
[
P − ci
1− τ
]
qi.
Since (1−τ) is constant it acts as a pure profit tax. Hence in the equilibrium
outputs of firm 1 and firm 2 in presence of an ad valorem tax of level τ are
qa1 =
a− 2c11−τ
3
and qa2 =
a+ c11−τ
3
. (4)
8It is assumed that t is not so high such that firm 2 is the monopolist.
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Similarly, the profits of firm 1 and firm 2 in case of an ad valorem tax of
level τ are 9
Πa1 =
(1− τ)[a− 2c11−τ ]2
9
and Πa2 =
(1− τ)[a+ c11−τ ]2
9
. (5)
Hence, comparing equation (1) and (4) it can be said that the industry
output is same in the two tax schedule, i.e. qu1 + q
u
2 = q
a
1 + q
a
2 , if
t =
τ
1− τ
c1
2
. (6)
This also implies that given relation (6), the equilibrium price is also same
in the two tax regime. Thus it can be said as in Anderson et al. (2001) that
“any equilibrium under the unit tax is also an equilibrium under the ad
valorem tax (and vice versa)”, given relation (6). Therefore the tax revenue
collected under the ad valorem tax of level τ is
Ra = τP
a(qa1 + q
a
2) = τ
[
a+ c11−τ
3
][
2a− c11−τ
3
]
, (7)
where P a =
(a+
c1
1−τ )
3 is the price and q
a
1 +q
a
2 =
2a− c1
1−τ
3 is the industry output
under ad valorem tax.
Comparing the tax revenues under the two different tax schemes, given
relation (6), it is found that
Ra −Ru = (qa1 + qa2)[τP a − t] = (qa1 + qa2)
[
τ
(a+ c11−τ )
3
− τ
1− τ
c1
2
]
= (qa1 + q
a
2)
τ
6
[
2a− c1
1− τ
]
> 0. (8)
This implies that as Ra − Ru > 0, for any given unit tax t, there exists
an ad valorem tax τ with a higher tax revenue. Since the industry output
is same in the two tax scheme, therefore the consumer surplus and price
are also same. This implies that the total industry revenue is also same
under the two tax schemes. Therefore to compare the relative efficiencies10
9As in case of unit tax it is assumed that τ is not so high such that firm 2 is the
monopolist.
10Efficiency is measured in terms of Social Surplus, as in Anderson et al. (2001), where
Social Surplus comprises of consumer surplus, net industry profit (profit after payment of
tax) and tax revenue of the government.
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of the two tax schemes, evaluating the total industry cost and finding out
which taxation minimizes it is sufficient. The total industry cost in case of
unit tax is TCu = c1q
u
1 and in case of ad valorem tax it is TCa = c1q
a
1 ,
as the unit cost of firm 2 is zero. Using relation (6) it can be showed that
TCu − TCa = tc1 > 0. This implies that industry profit (gross, without
paying tax) is more under ad valorem tax than under unit tax. Therefore as
shown in Anderson et al. (2001), the ad valorem tax is more efficient than
the unit tax.
The Benchmark Result: In a homogeneous Cournot market the ad val-
orem tax is more efficient than the unit tax in absence of licensing opportu-
nities.
In other words it can be said that if the objective of the government is
to extract revenue of level say R¯ by unit tax, then there always exists an ad
valorem tax such that tax revenue is more than R¯. This not only ensures
higher tax revenues for the government but also higher social surplus with
same consumer surplus.
3. Taxation in presence of fixed-fee licensing
This section incorporates the licensing opportunities in the benchmark
case to observe whether the ad valorem tax still dominates the unit tax.
This is important because after the announcement of tax rates by the gov-
ernment the firms may decide for licensing of technology before it produces
the output.
Let us first consider fixed-fee licensing in the context of unit tax. If
t(> 0) per unit of output sold is levied, the effective unit cost of firm 1 and
firm 2 are c1 + t and t respectively. As considered in the literature, e.g.
Marjit (1990), Wang (1998), if firm 2 licenses its technology to firm 1 then
the unit cost of firm 1 becomes c2 or zero. As in the present context a unit
tax of level t is imposed by the government, licensing of technology leads to
the reduction of the effective unit cost of firm 1 from c1 + t to t.
If technology is not licensed then the profits of firm 1 and firm 2 are
Πu1 and Π
u
2 respectively as defined in (2). However, if firm 2 licenses its
technology at a fixed-fee (F u), then the profits of firm 1 and firm 2 are
Πuf1 =
(a− t)2
9
− F u and Πuf2 =
(a− t)2
9
+ F u (9)
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respectively. In this regard firm 2 will set F u as high as possible such that,
Πuf1 =
(a−t)2
9 − F¯ u = Πu1 . Therefore technology will be licensed if
Πuf2 =
(a− t)2
9
+ F¯ u =
2(a− t)2
9
−Πu1 ≥ Πu2 . (10)
This also implies that technology is licensed if 2(a−t)
2
9 ≥ Πu1 + Πu2 , i.e. the
industry profit must increase after licensing. This happens only when
c1 + t ≤ 2a+ 3t
5
. (11)
If technology is licensed then not only the industry profit (net of tax) in-
creases but also the consumer surplus and government tax revenue Ru, as
licensing leads to higher industry output. Using (11) it can be said that if t
is marginally higher such that technology is not licensed, then it is optimal
for the government to reduce t slightly such that technology is licensed. It
will not only lead to higher revenue for the government but also higher social
surplus (consumer surplus plus industry profit plus tax revenue).
Proposition 1. If technology is licensed then under unit taxation tax rev-
enue, consumer surplus and industry profit increases after transfer.
Similarly in case of ad valorem tax of level τ , as Πi = (1−τ)[P− ci1−τ ]qi,
the effective unit cost (ignoring the constant term 1 − τ in the profit func-
tion) of firm 1 and firm 2 can be considered as c11−τ and 0 respectively. In
this regard if firm 2 licenses its technology to firm 1 then the actual unit
cost of firm 1 becomes c2 or zero. However the effective unit cost of firm 1
also reduces from c11−τ to 0.
As defined in (5) in the presence of ad valorem tax if technology is not
licensed then the profits of firm 1 and firm 2 are Πa1 and Π
a
2 respectively.
On the other hand, if firm 2 licenses its technology at a fixed-fee (F a), then
the profits of firm 1 and firm 2 are
Πaf1 =
(1− τ)a2
9
− F a and Πaf2 =
(1− τ)a2
9
+ F a (12)
respectively. In this regard firm 2 will set F a = F¯ a as high as possible
such that firm 1 remains indifferent between licensing and no-licensing or
Πaf1 =
(1−τ)a2
9 − F¯ a = Πa1. Therefore technology will be licensed if
Πaf2 =
(1− τ)a2
9
+ F¯ a =
2(1− τ)a2
9
−Πa1 ≥ Πa2. (13)
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The above condition implies that technology is licensed if 2(1−τ)a
2
9 ≥ Πa1+Πa2,
the industry profit increase after licensing or
c1
1− τ ≤
2a
5
. (14)
As in case of unit tax if technology is licensed then not only the industry
profit (net of tax) increases but also the consumer surplus. However, gov-
ernment tax revenue before licensing is Ra, as defined in (7), while after
licensing it is Raf = τ
2a2
9 . Moreover, Ra−Raf = c1τ9(1−τ)(a− c11−τ ) > 0. This
is true for any values of c1.
11 Hence, the tax revenue for c11−τ ≤ 2a5 is always
less than when it is not.
Proposition 2. If technology is licensed then under ad valorem taxation
the tax revenue reduces but consumer surplus and industry profit increases.
This implies that if technology is licensed the government revenue will def-
initely fall. In case of unit taxation, tax revenue is tq. As after licensing
industry output expands it leads to increase in the tax revenue under unit
taxation for any tax rate t. However, in case of ad valorem tax, as tax is
levied on the value of the industry output, the tax revenue is τPq. After the
expansion in the industry output due to licensing, the fall in price dominates
the expansion in industry output and hence leads to fall in the tax revenue
for the government under ad valorem taxation.12
Proposition 3. In case of ad valorem taxation, for higher tax revenue the
government will set τ as high as possible such that technology is not licensed
if c1 <
2a
5 .
It can be construed from the above proposition that licensing has a negative
impact on the government earnings and therefore for ensuring higher public
expenditure the government must restrict licensing by charging higher τ .13
Let government set a ad valorem tax τ , such that the revenue is more
in ad valorem tax than in unit tax with same industry output in both tax
11It is assumed that a− c1
1−τ > 0, as otherwise firm 2 will become the monopolist, which
is not possible. It is also important to note that Ra always increases in τ .
12In general the effect of licensing on tax revenue under ad valorem taxation is ambigu-
ous, as it depends on the elasticity of the demand.
13It can be assumed that the objective of the government is to extract higher tax
revenues, in that context under ad valorem tax it will charge a high τ such that technology
is not licensed. Otherwise licensing will fetch a lower tax revenue to the government.
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schemes. Substituting t = τ1−τ
c1
2 as defined earlier, which is the level of
t given τ such that industry output is same (in absence of licensing), in
relation (11), it is found that if such t is set by the government technology
is licensed under unit tax if
c1
1− τ ≤
2a
5− 4τ . (15)
Now comparing relation (14) and (15) it can be said that the possibility of
licensing (with same industry output in the two tax scheme) is more in case
of unit tax than in ad valorem tax as 2a5−4τ >
2a
5 . In case of fixed-fee licensing
if the government set t and τ such that the industry output is same in the
two tax scheme (in absence of licensing), then the possibility of transfer is
more in unit tax than in ad valorem tax.
3.1. Superiority of unit tax
It is established in the literature by Delipalla and Keen (1992) and An-
derson et al. (2001) that ad valorem tax is relatively more efficient than
unit tax in homogeneous Counot oligopoly is absence of licensing possibili-
ties. However, licensing may change this welfare ranking. To fix ideas, we
concentrate on a particular situation.
Suppose c1 <
2a
5 , such that technology is licensed in absence of taxation.
Moreover assume τ is high such that technology is not transferred via fixed-
fee as relation (14) is not satisfied. It can be assumed that the government
charges a higher τ such that technology is not transferred as it reduces the
tax revenue as discussed earlier (See Proposition 2).
Proposition 4. If the ad valorem tax rate is such that technology is not
licensed, such that government gets higher tax revenues, then there exists a
unit tax such that technology is licensed and social surplus is more than in
case of ad valorem tax.
Proof. Assume τ much high such that technology is not transferred via
fixed-fee as relation (14) is not satisfied, this implies that industry output
in such a situation will be
qa1 + q
a
2 =
2a− c11−τ
3
. (16)
Contrarily assume that t is set such that technology is transferred as relation
(11) holds. Then under unit tax industry output will be
quf1 + q
uf
2 =
2(a− t)
3
. (17)
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From equation (16) and (17) it can be said that if
t =
c1
2(1− τ) , (18)
then industry output will be same under the two tax schemes. Putting the
value of t from the above equation in relation (11) such that technology is
licensed in case of unit tax ensures that τ must be much greater than 0.2
such that relation (11) holds and relation (14) does not. If relation (14)
holds, then technology will also be licensed in case of ad valorem tax. Here
it is assumed that τ is set by the government such that technology is not
licensed. This will ensure that consumer surplus as well as total industry
revenue will also be same under the two tax schemes. Therefore to compare
the relative efficiencies of the two tax schemes, as in the benchmark case
evaluating the total industry cost and finding out which taxation minimizes
it is sufficient. The total industry cost in case of unit tax is TCuf = 0,
as technology is licensed and in case of ad valorem tax it is TCa = c1q
a
1 .
Therefore TCu < TCa. This implies that industry profit (gross, without
paying tax) is more under unit tax than under ad valorem tax. Therefore
contrary to Anderson et al. (2001), the ad valorem tax is less efficient than
the unit tax. Moreover, if it is assumed that c1 limits to
2a(1−τ)
5 (slightly
greater), then Ruf > Ra. Hence the social surplus is more in unit tax than
in the ad valorem tax.
For an alternative proof of this proposition refer to Appendix A.1.
3.2. Superiority of ad valorem tax
Reconsider the situation that c1 <
2a
5 . If c1 is very low then relation
(11) and (14) will be satisfied, ensuring licensing of technology both under
ad valorem and unit tax schemes. In this case as technology is licensed in
both the tax schemes the revenues of the government under unit tax and ad
valorem tax are
Ruf =
2t(a− t)
3
and Raf =
2a2τ
9
. (19)
If Ruf = Raf , such that the two tax schemes yields equal revenue, then
τ =
3t(a− t)
a2
. (20)
11
Under such tax rates the consumer surplus (CS) and industry profit in unit
tax is always less than ad valorem tax,
CSuf =
2(a− t)2
9
< CSaf =
2a2
9
Πuf1 + Π
uf
2 =
2(a− t)2
9
< Πaf1 + Π
af
2 =
2a2(1− τ)
9
.
This implies that under fixed-fee it technology is licensed under both the
schemes, then ad valorem tax will dominate unit tax.
Proposition 5. Under fixed-fee licensing if c1 <
2a
5 , and tax rates are such
that technology is licensed under both the schemes then ad valorem tax will
dominate unit tax.
However if c1 >
2a
5 , this implies technology is never licensed as relation
(11) and (14) do not hold. In this context as in “The Benchmark Result” it
can be said that the ad valorem tax is efficient than the unit tax. Therefore,
if c1 >
2a
5 , technology will not be licensed via fixed-fee in both the tax
schemes and hence ad valorem tax will dominate the unit tax as in the
benchmark case.
4. Taxation in presence of royalty licensing
This section incorporates the royalty licensing in the benchmark case to
observe whether the ad valorem tax still dominates the unit tax. Let us
begin with unit tax. If technology is not licensed then the profits of firm 1
and firm 2 are Πu1 and Π
u
2 respectively as defined in (2). However, if firm 2
licenses its technology at a per-unit royalty (ru), then the profits of firm 1
and firm 2 are
Πur1 =
[a− 2(ru + t) + t]2
9
and
Πur2 =
[a− 2t+ (ru + t)]2
9
+
ru[a− 2(ru + t) + t]
3
(21)
respectively. In this regard firm 2 will set ru as high as possible such that,
Πur1 =
[a−2(ru+t)+t]2
9 = Π
u
1 or r
u = c1, as post licensing profit of firm 2
increases in ru. The licensor cannot charge ru > c1, as this will entail paying
bribe to the licensee, violating the antitrust law as discussed in Shapiro
(1985). Therefore technology is licensed always as
Πur2 =
[a− 2t+ (c1 + t)]2
9
+
c1[a− 2(c1 + t) + t]
3
≥ Πu2 . (22)
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Unlike fixed-fee licensing, the consumer surplus and government tax revenue
remains unchanged when licensing takes place via royalty payments. Fauli-
Oller and Sandonis (2002) and Wang (1998) discusses that a royalty licensing
scheme keeps the industry output unaltered and thus no possible channel
exits through which consumer surplus and tax revenues can change. It is to
be noted that competition remains unchanged after licensing of technology,
as the effective unit cost of firm 1 remains unchanged. Only the profit of the
firm 2 increases, leading to increase in the industry profit by the amount of
the cost reduction produced by the use of the new technology of firm 2.
Proposition 6. Under unit taxation technology is always licensed. The tax
revenue and the consumer surplus remain unchanged, while the industry
profit increases after transfer of technology.
Let us now consider the effect of royalty licensing in the presence of ad
valorem tax. As in equation (5) technology is not licensed and the profits
of firm 1 and firm 2 are Πa1 and Π
a
2 respectively. On the other hand, if firm
2 licenses its technology at a royalty rate (ra), then the profits of firm 1 and
firm 2 are
Πar1 =
(1− τ)[a− 2 ra1−τ ]2
9
and Πar2 =
(1− τ)[a+ ra1−τ ]2
9
+
ra[a− 2 ra1−τ ]
3
(23)
respectively. As in case of unit tax, here too firm 2 will set ra as high as
possible such that, Πar1 =
(1−τ)[a−2 ra
1−τ ]
2
9 = Π
a
1 or r
a = c1, as post licensing
profit of firm 2 increases in ra. Therefore technology is licensed always as
Πar2 =
(1− τ)[a+ c11−τ ]2
9
+
c1[a− 2 c11−τ ]
3
≥ Πa2. (24)
It can be discussed as before that the consumer surplus and government
tax revenue remains unchanged. However, the profit of the firm 2 increases,
leading to increase in the industry profit.
Proposition 7. Under ad valorem taxation via royalty technology is always
licensed. The tax revenue and the consumer surplus remain unchanged, while
the industry profit increases after transfer of technology.
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the two tax schemes it is important
to compare the increase in the profit of firm 2 in the two tax schemes. In
case of unit tax from equation (22) it can be said that the increase in the
profit of firm 2 after licensing is
Πur2 −Πu2 =
c1
3
[a− 2c1 − t]. (25)
13
However, from equation (24), the increase in the profit of firm 2 in case of
ad valorem tax is
Πar2 −Πa2 =
c1
3
[a− 2c1
1− τ ]. (26)
Now comparing these increase in profits it can be said that
Πur2 −Πu2 > Πar2 −Πa2 if
2c1τ
1− τ > t. (27)
Moreover as Raf − Ruf = Ra − Ru > 0, (which is discussed in the
Benchmark case), for any given unit tax t, there exists an ad valorem tax
τ with a higher tax revenue. Since the industry output is same in the two
tax scheme after licensing, if it is assumed that t = τ1−τ
c1
2 (See the section
“The Benchmark case” equation (6)), then the consumer surplus and price
are also same. This in turn implies that the total revenue remains equal in
both tax schemes after licensing. Therefore to consider the efficiency of the
ad valorem tax scheme, evaluating the total industry cost is meaningful to
construe the industry profit after licensing. The total industry cost in case
of unit tax after licensing is TCur = 0 and in case of ad valorem tax it is
TCar = 0, as technology is always licensed and the unit cost of firm 2 is
zero. Contrary to Anderson et al. (2001) the social surplus after licensing
is same under the two tax schemes.
Proposition 8. As technology is always licensed under unit tax and ad val-
orem tax via per unit royalty, there always exits a unit tax t for any given ad
valorem tax τ such that after licensing equilibrium output and total industry
revenue are same under the two tax schemes. The social surplus remains
same in both these tax schemes after licensing. However if the government
wants to acquire higher tax revenue it will choose ad valorem taxation.
The above proposition also implies that in such a case as the consumer sur-
plus is same under the two tax schemes, if the government chooses ad val-
orem tax (unit tax) schemes, the government revenue will be higher (lower)
and the net industry profit will be lower (higher) than unit tax (ad valorem
tax) schemes.
Conclusion
This paper considers the relative efficiency of unit tax and ad valorem
tax in Cournot doupoly in the presence of licensing opportunities after the
announcement of the tax rates by the government. If technology is licensed
by fixed-fee, tax revenue, consumer surplus and industry profit increases
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after transfer under unit taxation. However, the tax revenue reduces but
consumer surplus and industry profit increases after fixed-fee licensing un-
der ad valorem taxation. This implies that under ad valorem taxation, for
higher tax revenue the government may set the advalorem tax rate as high as
possible such that technology is not licensed. In case of licensing by fixed-fee
if technology is licensed in both the tax schemes then ad valorem dominates
the unit tax. However, if the ad valorem tax rate is such that technology
is not licensed, then there exists a unit tax such that technology is licensed
and social surplus is more than in the case of ad valorem tax.
Both under unit tax and ad valorem taxation technology is always li-
censed via per unit royalty. In both of the tax schemes tax revenue and the
consumer surplus remains unchanged after licensing and only the industry
profit increases. This implies that there always exits a unit tax rate for any
given ad valorem tax rate such that after licensing equilibrium output and
total industry revenue are same under the two tax schemes. Therefore un-
der royalty licensing the two tax schemes are equally efficient. Thus, royalty
licensing ensures equal consumer surplus and equal gross industry profit un-
der the two tax schemes. This ensures same social surplus under the two
tax schemes, however the government gets higher tax revenues under the
ad valorem taxation. Wang (1998), Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002) and
Sen (2014) show that in homogeneous goods Cournot model with constant
unit cost optimal two-part tariff licensing entails to only positive per-unit
royalty with zero fixed-fee. Thus we desist from disussing two part tariffs in
the present model.
There are a number of directions in which this analysis can be extended.
Anderson et al. (2001a) and Wang and Zhao (2009) considers indirect
taxes when oligopolistic firms produce differentiated goods. Anderson et
al. (2001a) studies the incidence of these tax schemes with differentiated
products and price-setting firms. Wang and Zhao (2009) shows that unit
taxation can be welfare superior to ad valorem taxation in asymmetric and
differentied oligopolies. The present paper can be extended to consider the
effect of licensing in differentiated goods Cournot and Bertrand duopoly with
asymmetric cost structures to evaluate the efficiency of the tax schemes. As
the present paper considers each type of taxes separately, a possible future
research agenda can be to explore licensing possibilities when a combination
of these taxes are adopted (See Myles (1996)).
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Appendix A.
Appendix A.1.
Suppose, c1 <
2a
5 and suppose
c1
1−τ >
2a
5 (limitingly greater), this implies
that technology is not licensed in case of ad valorem tax. It can be assumed
that the government charges a higher τ such that technology is not trans-
ferred as it reduces the tax revenue as discussed earlier (See Proposition 2).
In this context if the government imposes a unit tax t, such that c1 + t ≤ 2a5
(where t = τ1−τ
c1
2 ), then technology will be transferred as relation (15) is
satisfied. In this context the government tax revenues under ad valorem tax
and unit tax are respectively
Ra = τ [
a+ c11−τ
3
][
2a− c11−τ
3
] and Ruf =
2t(a− t)
3
. (A.1)
Moreover as it is been assumed that t = τ1−τ
c1
2 , therefore Ruf =
c1τ
3(1−τ) [a−
c1τ
2(1−τ) ]. In can be further said that as c1 limits to
2a(1−τ)
5 (slightly greater)
then
Ra =
56a2τ
225
> Ruf =
2aτ
15
[a− aτ
5
]. (A.2)
Further the industry profits in case of ad valorem tax and unit tax are
respectively
Πa1 + Π
a
2 =
(1− τ)[a− 2c11−τ ]2
9
+
(1− τ)[a+ c11−τ ]2
9
(A.3)
and
Πuf1 + Π
uf
2 =
2(a− t)2
9
=
2(a− τ1−τ c12 )2
9
. (A.4)
In can be further said as before that if c1 limits to
2a(1−τ)
5 (slightly greater)
then the industry profit is always greater in case of unit tax as
Πuf1 + Π
uf
2 =
2a2
9
[1− τ
5
]2 > Πa1 + Π
a
2 =
2a2(1− τ)
9
. (A.5)
Similarly, the consumer surplus14 (CS) is greater in unit tax
CSuf =
2a2
9
[1− τ
5
]2 > CSa =
8a2
225
. (A.6)
14From the demand function it can be showed that if the equilibrium output is q,
consumer surplus will be q
2
2
.
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Finally the difference in the Social surplus15 (SS) are
SSuf − SSa = 2a
2
225
[6− 8τ − τ2]. (A.7)
Therefore SSuf − SSa > 0 if τ is less or c1 slightly lower than 2a5 . The
present discussion therefore proves that if the government charges an ad
valorem tax τ such that technology is not transferred for acquiring higher
tax revenue, then there exists a unit tax t = τ1−τ
c1
2 , such that technology
is licensed. In that case the consumer surplus and industry profit, if the
government charges such a unit tax, is higher than in ad valorem tax. The
social surplus will also be higher in unit tax than in case of ad valorem tax.
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